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The dynamics of government
Abstract
We model income redistribution with dynamic distortions as determined by rational voting without
commitment among individuals of di¤erent types and income realizations. We …nd that redistribution is
too persistent relative to that chosen by a planner with commitment. The di¤erence is larger, the lower is
the political in‡uence of young agents, the lower is the altruistic concern for future generations, and the
lower is risk-aversion. Furthermore, there tends to be too much redistribution in the political
equilibrium. Finally, smooth preference aggregation, as under probabilistic voting, produces less
persistence and does not admit multiple equilibria, which occur under majority-voting aggregation.
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We model income redistribution with dynamic distortions as determined by rational
voting without commitment among individuals of di¤erent types and income realizations.
We nd that redistribution is too persistent relative to that chosen by a planner with
commitment. The di¤erence is larger, the lower is the political inuence of young agents,
the lower is the altruistic concern for future generations, and the lower is risk-aversion.
Furthermore, there tends to be too much redistribution in the political equilibrium. Finally,
smooth preference aggregation, as under probabilistic voting, produces less persistence and
does not admit multiple equilibria, which occur under majority-voting aggregation.
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1. Introduction
The evolution of the modern welfare state transfers across consumers that are
put in place via the democratic process is arguably an important determinant
both of inequality and aggregate macroeconomic performance. Yet there are few
theoretical analyses of its determinants. To a large extent, this is likely due to the
complexity of dynamic models with endogenous policy. Some analyses therefore
restrict attention to models that are static in essence, thus not allowing forward-
looking decisions, such as investment, to interact with policy choice. Other analyses
incorporate realistic investment decisions but instead derive all results with numer-
ical methods. Our ultimate aim is to provide a framework which is quantitatively
reasonable, but which also allows the mechanisms to be understood as well as pos-
sible.
In this paper, we develop a theory of the dynamics of the welfare state that allows
nontrivial forward-looking in investment but which can be analyzed analytically.
Voters are selsh and rational: transfer policy is democratically determined by
citizens whose only aim is to inuence policy so as to maximize their own utility. The
tractability we gain, and which comes from simplifying assumptions on preferences
and technology, allows us to isolate and analyze the origins of the endogenous policy
dynamics. When these assumptions are relaxed in future work, we will also learn
what features of preferences and technology are important for policy dynamics.
There are two roles of redistribution in our model. First, it is a pure wealth transfer
motivated by selsh concerns: ex post, some agents are rich and others poor, and to
the extent that the poor have political inuence, they achieve net redistribution in
their favor. Second, transfers also provide agents with ex-ante insurance, because we
consider a world where insurance markets for individual risk are missing. Moreover,
redistribution is costly: it reduces e¤ort. Costly e¤ort is expended as a function
of its benets the di¤erence between a high-wage and a low-wage outcome and
transfers from the rich to the poor thus reduce this benet. We assume agents to be
identical ex ante, but that individual preferences over redistribution then diverge as
agents age, since some become successful in life, while others are less fortunate. The
political system we consider does not have any direct commitment mechanisms
current voters cannot bind the hands of future voters and we focus on the case
where reputational mechanisms are absent.
Our setup has implications both for the long-run (average) level of redistribution
and for the redistribution dynamics. The main primitives in our model are (i) the
political mechanism (we assume a probabilistic-voting setup à la Lindbeck and
Weibull, 1987), (ii) the associated weights on di¤erent agents (such as on the old
versus on the young), (iii) the amount of risk aversion of agents, (iv) a measure
of the distortionary impact of taxation, and (v) the income distribution, whose
endogenous evolution drives the dynamics by which the size of government evolves.
The long-run size of government is higher with higher risk aversion, lower when
the distortionary impact of taxes is large, and lower when the interests of future
generations are better represented in the political process.
The dynamics of taxation depend on the size of the group of poor through
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two channels. First, a large such group makes the tax cost per unit of benets
high. Thus, redistribution is more costly the larger is the group of poor agents.
This speaks for lower taxes and redistribution. We call this the tax-base e¤ect ;
the optimum under commitment discussed above precisely builds on trading o¤
these tax-base e¤ects over time. Second, induced intergenerational redistribution
is a¤ected by the number of poor voters relative to the number of future poor.
Specically, the transfer in favor of the current generation is high when the current
number of poor is relatively high. We label this the constituency e¤ect which goes
in the opposite direction of the tax-base e¤ect: a larger number of poor agents
speaks for higher taxes. Depending on parameter values, we can either have a tax
rate which is increasing or decreasing in the size of the group of poor. The tax-base
and constituency e¤ects are key in driving the dynamics of our equilibria.
When risk-aversion is high, so that insurance is highly socially valuable, the
dynamics feature oscillations: redistribution is high (low) in periods when the num-
ber of beneciaries is low (high). This prediction is broadly consistent with some
empirical evidence. For example, DiTella and MacCullough (2002) nd that unem-
ployment benets (replacement rates) fall as the unemployment rate increases in
a panel of OECD countries. Similarly, Razin et al. (2002) document that pension
benets fall as the dependency ratios increase.
One might suspect that the oscillatory nature of the dynamics is the result of
political distortions, as argued in di¤erent contexts by the literature on political
business cycles(see Alesina, Roubini and Cohen 1997 for a survey). Surprisingly,
we reach the opposite conclusion: the political mechanism exerts a stabilizing in-
uence on the redistribution dynamics and, in fact, renders it too smooth. More
precisely, we nd that relative to a constrained optimalallocation, the political
system dampens, and for some parameter values even completely eliminates, the
cycles that would be present in the optimal allocation. Our political equilibrium
always settles down to a steady state, though for some parameter values in an os-
cillatory manner. In contrast, the constrained optimum may entail oscillations that
do not die out.
The fact that taxes oscillate in the Ramsey allocation is interesting per se, as
it seems to contrast with the usual tax-smoothing wisdom (see, e.g., Barro, 1979).
A more general analysis of this issue is developed in Hassler et al. (2004). The
intuition is the following. E¤ort decisions associated with human capital accumu-
lation (like schooling, learning on the job, etc.) yield returns over many years.
Thus, the taxes relevant to an agents e¤ort decision is the present value of taxes
on the product of the e¤ort. For example, the decision to obtain an MBA degree
is distorted by all taxes on income accruing during the lifetime following the de-
gree. Thus, an agent contemplating a human capital accumulation decision early
on in life consider, as we do here, two-period-lived agents making a one-time ef-
fort choice at the beginning of life does not particularly care about whether taxes
uctuate over time or are constant. It follows that optimal allocations tend to lead
to cycles, because if there is a reason to tax at a high rate at a point in time,
e.g., to redistribute to the initial old or to nance a one-time expenditure, then
the distortionary impact of this tax hike can be reduced by lowering taxes in the
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next period.1 However, since taxes are lowered the following period, taxes must, in
order to keep the present value constant, be increased again two periods forward.
The pattern is repeated: a one-time splash produces ripples. The political system
reduces these (constrained-optimal) oscillations because it lacks commitment. It
cannot automatically adjust future or past taxes to reduce the distortionary im-
pact of redistribution and social insurance. Thus, oscillations are partly or fully
o¤set with politically determined taxation.
We emphasize the lack of commitment in the political mechanism by focusing
entirely on equilibria which are limits of the corresponding nite-horizon economies.
The absence of reputation mechanisms is operationalized by focusing on (in our case,
linear) Markov-perfect equilibria. Of course, if the horizon is literally innite and
there is su¢ ciently low discounting, one could construct a large variety of equilibria
(for this approach, see, e.g., Bernheim and Nataraj, 2002). We think, however, that
it is useful to carefully examine the implications of a complete lack of commitment.
Moreover, in models with state variables, there are channels allowing current voters
to inuence the future, thus not replicating commitment but imperfectly replacing
it, as in the strategic-debt literature (see e.g. Persson and Svensson, 1989). Here,
the state variable is the initial group of unlucky agents: a large such group tends
to lead to high redistribution in the current period (assuming that equilibrium
redistribution is driven by the constituency e¤ect). As a consequence, next periods
redistribution can be inuenced today by using current taxes to inuence current
e¤ort and, hence, a¤ecting the set of unlucky agents at the beginning of the next
period.
Once the attention has been limited to Markov equilibria, we still face the impor-
tant question of whether our political Markov equilibria are unique: can we expect
stability in the size of government in democracies? A similar setup, considered
in Hassler et al. (2003a), assumes Downsian majority voting and nds that Markov
equilibria are not unique: in one equilibrium the welfare state survives, while in an-
other it collapses. In that case, multiplicity arises from a stark feature of majority
voting models; the equilibrium tax rate increases discontinuously as the number of
poor exceeds 50%. This opens the possibility of voting strategicallyover redistrib-
ution to induce future changes in the majority. The probabilistic-voting mechanism,
in contrast, features a smooth mapping from group sizes to tax outcomes. In fact,
we show here that multiple equilibria cannot occur with probabilistic voting in the
nite- and innite-horizon equilibria of our baseline setup, whereas they can with
majority voting.
All results are analytical, due to the assumption that the investment decision
e¤ort exerted to increase the probability of becoming productive in the future 
is modelled with a quadratic cost and a linear benet. This approach is similar
to that addressing strategic concerns in the literature on time-consistent policies
and di¤erential games (see e.g. Cohen and Michel, 1988; and Hansen and Sargent,
2004). The combination of politics and economics is what poses a di¢ culty; one
needs to model strategic voting interactions, where political agents consider the
1We abstract from the ability of governments to run decits here, but introducing decit -
nancing does not eliminate tax-driven cycles; see Hassler et al. (2004) for details.
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consequences of their choice on future political outcomes, as well as appeal to dy-
namic equilibrium theory to ensure that all economic agents consumers, rms and
government maximize their respective objective functions under rational expecta-
tions and resource feasibility. Most nontrivial dynamic models (that is, that are not
repeated static frameworks or purely backward-lookingsetups) rely on numerical
solution (see, e.g., Krusell and Ríos-Rull (1999)). Hassler et al. (2003a) provided a
tractable linear-quadratic framework where voters are inuenced both by the state
of the economy the current income distribution and foresee e¤ects of the current
policy outcomes on both future income distributions and future voting outcomes,
about which they care. The present paper uses a model similar to that of Hassler
et al. (2003a), but extends it in a technically non-trivial and economically impor-
tant way by introducing a social insurance motive, and considering a richer voting
model, i.e., probabilistic voting.2
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2. presents the economic structure of
the model, and Section 3. describes the political decision making and analyzes po-
litically determined redistribution. Section 3.4. discusses uniqueness of equilibrium
under a nite horizon, and the connection between our Markov-perfect equilibrium
and the limit of nite-horizon equilibria. Section 3.5. studies the case where vot-
ers are altruistic toward future generations (but cannot commit to future policy).
Finally, Section 4. analyzes the constrained optimum: the allocation chosen by a
planner who cares about future generations and has commitment. Section 5. con-
cludes. Most proofs are provided in a technical appendix available upon request.3
2. The model
2.1. Population, preferences, technology, and policy
The model economy has a continuum of two-period lived agents, who work in
both periods. Upon birth, agents are subject to an ability shock. With probability
, an agent is high-skilled, and with probability 1  , she is low-skilled. We label
high-skilled agents entrepreneursand low-skilled agents workers. Entrepreneurs
undertake a risky investment in human capital, yielding a stochastic return. With
probability e, the investment is successful and the entrepreneur earns labor income
w + w in each period, where w  1. With probability 1   e, the investment is
unsuccessful, and the labor income is w in each period. The cost of investment
is e2, and we interpret it as the disutility of educational e¤ort. Workers earn an
income normalized to zero, which cannot be a¤ected by human capital investments.
To make the problem interesting, we assume that the component w of the entre-
preneurial income is not veriable. Therefore, insurance agencies, whether private
2 In Hassler et al. (2003a), redistribution is, by construction, socially wasteful, as it distorts in-
centives, while agents are risk neutral, so that insurance has no value. Therefore, the constrained-
optimal allocation always entails zero redistribution, and the paper does not yield interesting
normative implications. Apart from the di¤erent assumption about the political mechanism (ma-
jority vs. probabilistic voting), the model presented here encompasses Hassler et al. (2003a) as
the particular case in which agents are risk neutral, as will be shown in the subsequent discussion.
3See http://www.iies.su.se/~zilibott/jmeappendix.pdf.
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or public, cannot condition payments on agentsskills, but can only discriminate
between successful entrepreneurs (with a veriable income equal to w) and the rest
of the population (with a veriable income normalized to zero).
Agentspreferences are given by
V yt = Et[v (ct) + v (ct+1)  e2t ];
where  2 [0; 1] is the discount factor and
v (c) =

ac  (a  1)x if c < x
c if c  x ;
with a  1. Thus, felicity is concave and piecewise linear in consumption; marginal
utility drops discretely at a threshold consumption level x and is constant every-
where else, as shown in Figure 1. The kink in preferences helps us maintaining
analytical tractability while allowing ex-ante risk aversion. The parameter a regu-
lates the concavity of the utility function; if a = 1 agents are risk neutral, while if
a > 1 they are risk averse.
We assume that w > x, implying that, after the realization of the ability shock,
high-skill agents are e¤ectively risk-neutral. In particular, the marginal utility of in-
come for high-skill agents is equal to unity, independent of their income realization.
Since agents cannot sign contracts before their skill level is realized, this implies
that no private insurance market can exist. The government can, however, increase
the ex-ante utility of agents through redistributive programs providing insurance
behind the veil of ignorance. Like private insurers, governments can only con-
dition transfers on observable income. Unlike private insurers, however, they can
force agents to be part of the insurance scheme by setting compulsory taxes. In
particular, in each period, the government can levy a lump-sum tax  on all agents
and transfer the proceeds to individuals with low observable income (either workers
or unsuccessful entrepreneurs).4 We denote the transfer rate b 2 [0; 1], implying
that all agents but the successful entrepreneurs receive an amount bw: The gov-
ernment budget is assumed to balance in every period, and the government cannot
issue age-dependent taxes and transfers (see Hassler et al. (2003b) for an extension
where age-dependent programs are allowed).
************Figure 1 about here ****************
Furthermore, we assume that w < x: This assumption simplies the analysis, since
it implies that the marginal utility of low-skill agents is a > 1, irrespective of the
redistribution policy (recall that b  1).5 Thus, in summary, we assume that
w < x < w: (1)
4The assumption of lump-sum taxes is immaterial. It can be shown that the model is isomorphic
to one where transfers are nanced by taxation levied on the observable component of labor income.
The proof is available upon request.
5 In a previous version of this paper, we assumed that even workers had stochastic income, but
that this income process was exogenous and not inuenced by investments. This analysis led to
qualitatively similar results.
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Finally, we assume that the subjective discount rate, (1  ) =, equals the
market interest rate. Under this assumption, the savings decisions can be abstracted
from, since income is the same in both periods of life for all individuals.
2.2. Discussion of assumptions
We assume that only high skilled individuals have hidden income and make
an e¤ort choice and that individual ability is revealed already at the beginning of
life. These assumptions are stark, but we believe that they provide a reasonable
shortcut description of important real-world features: (i) in terms of their e¤ect
on productivity, the e¤ort and human capital investments of some workers are
more important than those of others; (ii) it is likely that those agents with high
entrepreneurial ability are also well-endowed in other dimensions, therefore having
higher income than workers also if they are less successful; and (iii) already before
entering college, individuals have a good idea of their prospects in life.6
Our model abstracts from physical capital. The e¤ects of redistribution on the
accumulation of physical capital may of course be important, but the distortion to
human capital accumulation considered here captures the same kind of dynamic
trade-o¤s that are present in a standard consumption-savings decision.
Why are insurance markets missing in our model, and why is there a role for
government-provided redistribution? In reality, parents are able to shelter their
o¤spring against some types of veriable ability shocks. In the model, we abstract
from this possibility by assuming that parents are not altruistic. However, even
though parental altruism should deliver some intergenerational insurance (for ex-
ample, that successful parents make transfers to unskilled children), we believe that
such insurance will never be perfect. Thus, democratic constitutions, allowing a
possibility to vote over transfers, provide redistribution with an ex-ante insurance
value that neither altruism nor private insurance markets can deliver.
The policy instruments available to the government are quite limited by de-
sign; in most political-economy setups and this one is no exception the policy
instruments are restricted so as to yield a nontrivial and interesting choice situ-
ation for voters/the government. We do not allow budget decits and surpluses
and, more importantly, we restrict the ability of governments to target transfers to
specic groups. In particular, we assume that unlucky entrepreneurs and workers
are pooled in the same program, while it would be benecial to separate them.
Although this is an extreme characterization, it captures the realistic feature that
welfare state programs are plagued by informational problems reducing their e¤ec-
tiveness and increasing their cost. The absence of government debt is instead due
to tractability consideration, and we plan to extend our analysis in this direction in
future research.
6For example, Keane and Wolpin (1997) argue that up to 90% of the variance of individuals
lifetime utility can be explained by information known when they are 16 years old.
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2.3. The determination of e¤ort as a function of government policy
Ignoring irrelevant constants, the utilities of the agents alive at time t can be
expressed as a function of government policy variables (benets and taxes) and
human capital investments:
V oest = w    t
V oeut = btw    t
V owt = a(btw    t) (2)
V yet = et (1 + )w + (1  et) (bt + bt+1)w   e2t   ( t +  t+1)
V ywt = a (btw    t +  (bt+1w    t+1)) ;
where superscripts oes, oeu; ow; ye and yw denote old successful entrepreneurs, old
unsuccessful entrepreneurs, old workers, young entrepreneurs and young workers,
respectively.
The optimal investment choice of the young entrepreneurs, given bt and bt+1, is
et = e (bt; bt+1) 
1 +    (bt + bt+1)
2
w: (3)
Since the realization of the investment is i.i.d. across entrepreneurs, and they all
choose the same level of e¤ort, et (bt; bt+1) is also the proportion of entrepreneurs
who become successful. Moreover, since success is persistent, this is also the pro-
portion of successful old entrepreneurs in period t + 1. It is useful to denote the
proportion of unsuccessful entrepreneurs by ut+1 = 1  et (bt; bt+1).7
The government budget constraint is 2 t = (2 (1  ) + ut +  (1  et ))wbt.
Using (3), we have
 t =  (bt; bt+1; ut) (4)
=

1 +

2

ut   1  (1 + ) w
2
+ (bt + bt+1)
w
2

btw:
The marginal tax cost of redistribution in period t, @=@bt, increases in ut
(because more old entrepreneurs are benet recipients) and in bt and bt+1 (because
more young entrepreneurs become unsuccessful). Since the old in period t cannot
enjoy any benets in period t+1, their equilibrium utility will therefore be decreasing
in bt+1.
Preliminary remarks about preferences for redistribution are as follows. The old
successful entrepreneurs prefer zero benets, since redistribution implies positive
taxes without providing them with any benets. Benet recipients (workers and
unsuccessful entrepreneurs), in contrast, are better o¤ with some redistribution,
even though their preferences for redistribution may be non-monotonic, as net ben-
ets may be falling with b at high levels of taxation, due to a La¤er curve e¤ect.
Note also that the La¤er curve is dynamic, depending both on historical investment
levels and expectations about future taxation.
7The restrictions 0  b  1 and w  1 imply that ut+1 2
h
1 
2
; 1
i
:
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After the ability shock is realized, young workers like redistribution more than
do young entrepreneurs. However, it should be noted that the government transfer
programs entail some intergenerational redistribution, since the proportion of old
and young successful entrepreneurs may di¤er. The preferences of the di¤erent
groups of young agents will therefore depend on the balance between inter- and
intra-generational e¤ects.
3. Political equilibrium
3.1. The political game
In the political equilibrium, the benet policy is chosen through voting each
period. In the benchmark case, we assume that agents vote over next periods
redistribution at the end of each period, after the uncertainty about individual
entrepreneurial earnings has been realized. Since the old have no interest at stake,
they are assumed to abstain. This is equivalent to assuming that agents vote over
the current benet policy before the e¤ort choice of the entrepreneurs is made, and
that only the old agents are entitled to vote (see Hassler et al., 2003a). We later
extend the analysis to the case when both the young and the old vote on current
benets.
3.1.1. Probabilistic voting
We assume a two-candidate political model of probabilistic voting à la Lind-
beck and Weibull (1987) and restrict attention to Markov-perfect equilibria. In this
model, whose features are extensively discussed in Persson and Tabellini (2000) and
which are therefore not detailed here, agents cast their votes on one of two candi-
dates, who maximize their probability of becoming elected. Voters have heteroge-
neous preferences not only over redistribution, but also over some non-economic-
policy dimension that is orthogonal to redistribution and over which the candidates
cannot make binding commitments. As in Persson and Tabellini (2000), we refer
to this additional dimension as ideology. Voters di¤er in their evaluation of the
candidatesideology and their preferences over this dimension are subject to an ag-
gregate shock whose realization is unknown to the candidates when platforms over
redistribution are set.8 In the equilibrium of this model, both candidates choose the
same platform over redistribution and each of them has a fty percent probability
of winning. More importantly, the impact of each group on the equilibrium policy
outcome increases with the relative weight in utility of the policy variable. Intu-
itively, if agents in a group have a lower concern for ideology, a candidate making a
small change in redistribution in favor of this group will trigger a larger increase in
her political support. In other terms, groups with many swing-voters are more
attractive to power-seeking candidates, and exert a stronger inuence on the equilib-
rium political outcome. Thus, we will assume that the relative concern for ideology
8Since candidates have no intrinsic preferences over redistribution, they are assumed to imple-
ment their promised platform.
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versus redistribution is the same within cohorts, but may vary between cohorts.
Under this assumption, it is straightforward to show that in equilibrium, the candi-
datesplatforms simply maximize a weighted sum of individual utilities, where the
weights are the same for all agents within a cohort but may di¤er between cohorts.
Thus, the equilibrium policy maximizes a political objective functionwhich is a
weighted average utility of all voters. We will consider the cases when the political
weight on the old is normalized to unity and the weight on the young is ! 2 [0; 1] :
3.1.2. Denition of equilibrium
The political aggregation of the di¤erent preferences is summarized by the
following function
V (bt; bt+1; bt+2; ut; ut+1) (5)
  ((1  ut)V oeut + utV oest ) + (1  )V owt + ! (V yet + (1  )V ywt ) ;
where the equilibrium functions et = e (bt; bt+1), as in (3), and  t =  (bt; bt+1; ut)
and  t+1 =  (bt+1; bt+2; ut+1) ; as in (4), have been substituted into each function
V jt dened in equations (2).
The function V entails the assumption that all agents within a given generation
exert the same political inuence, irrespective of type. In the general case where two
generations participate in each election, however, we allow for age-specic di¤erences
in the concern for the ideological dimension. This is parameterized by ! 2 [0; 1]: In
particular, ! < 1 means that on average, the old care less about ideology and have
more swing-voters than the young. Hence, their preferences carry more weight
in the political objective function, V . The opposite would be true if ! > 1, a case
that we do not consider. When ! = 1, all voters are equally represented.
We construct equilibria with linear policy functions (except for kinks implied
by bounds on benets) in the aggregate state variable: the proportion of current
unsuccessful old entrepreneurs, ut. The political equilibrium is dened as follows.
Denition 1 A political equilibrium is dened as a pair of functions hB;Ui, where
B : [0; 1] ! [0; 1] is a public policy rule, bt = B (ut), and U : [0; 1] ! [0; 1] is a
private decision rule, ut+1 = U (bt), such that, given the political weight ! 2 [0; 1]
on the young, the following functional equations hold:
1. B (ut) = argmaxbt2[0;1] V (bt; bt+1; bt+2; ut; ut+1) subject to ut+1 = U (bt),
bt+1 = B (U (bt)), and bt+2 = B(U(B (U (bt)))), and
2. U (bt) = 1  e (bt; bt+1) with bt+1 = B (U (bt)).
The rst equilibrium condition requires the political mechanism to choose bt to
maximize V , taking into account that future redistribution depends on the current
policy choice via the equilibrium private decision rule and future equilibrium public
policy rules. Furthermore, it requires B(ut) to be a xed point in the rst functional
equation of Denition 1. In other words, suppose that agents believe future benets
to be set according to the function bt+j = B (ut+j). Then, we require the same
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function B(ut) to dene optimal benets today. It should be noted that in the case
! = 0, the political objective in (5) depends only on bt, bt+1, and ut.
The second equilibrium condition states that young individuals choose their
investment optimally, given bt and bt+1, and that agents have rational expectations
about future benets and distributions of types. In general, U could be a function of
both ut and bt, but in our particular model ut has no direct e¤ect on the investment
choice of the young. Thus, in our equilibria the equilibrium investment choice of
the young is fully determined by the current benet level.
3.2. An economy where agents are risk-neutral
In this section, we consider the particular case when a = 1, i.e., when agents are
risk-neutral and therefore have the same preference intensity for economic policy ex
post. Here, the welfare state entails no insurance value.
It is instructive to see how the equilibrium is constructed. Let us therefore sketch
the method used to nd the political equilibrium in the simplest case when ! = 0,
leaving the details for the cases discussed later in the paper to a technical appendix
available upon request. Since in this case neither bt+2 nor ut+1 enter the aggregate
political preferences, we can rewrite (with a slight abuse of notation) the political
objective, (5), as
V (bt; bt+1; ut) =

2
(utbtw   (1  e (bt; bt+1))btw) + (1  ut)w: (6)
Note that the last term is exogenous from the voters perspective: it is prede-
termined. Omitting this and the proportionality factor =2; and noting that 1  
e (bt; bt+1) = ut+1, the political objective can therefore be written as (ut ut+1)btw:
positive benets help the current old only if the number of unsuccessful old entre-
preneurs exceeds the number of unsuccessful young entrepreneurs. Naturally, the
latter is determined by policy. Thus, the workers do not enter this expression: since
they are of equal number in each cohort, any transfers between them will net to
zero.
Disregarding constants and using the expression for e (bt; bt+1), the political
objective in (6) can be written as
utbtw  

1  (1 + ) w
2
+
w
2
(bt + bt+1)

btw: (7)
We need to nd two functions B(ut) and U(bt), satisfying the two equilibrium
conditions in Denition 7. Guided by the linear-quadratic form of the objective
function, we guess on the functional form for B: B(ut) = 0 + 1ut, for some
yet undetermined coe¢ cients 0 and 1. Using this guess, the second equilibrium
condition can be written as
U (bt) = 1  1 +    (bt +  (0 + 1U (bt)))
2
w: (8)
Solving for U(bt), we obtain
U (bt) =
2  w (1 +  (1  0)) + btw
2  1w : (9)
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Substituting the expression for U(bt) and the guess of B(ut) into the rst-order
condition and solving for bt gives
bt =
1
2w
( 2 + w (1 +  (1  0))) + 2  1w
2w
ut;
which veries the tentative guess as a xed-point of equilibrium condition 1 if
1 =
2
w(2+) and 0 =  1
 
1  12 (1 + )w

, heuristically establishing the fol-
lowing proposition.9
Proposition 2 Assume a = 1 and ! = 0 (risk neutrality, n, and only the old
vote, o). The political equilibrium is characterized as follows:
Bno (ut) =
 2
w(2+) (ut   uno) if ut  uno
0 else
Uno (bt) = u
no +
w
2

1 +

2

bt;
and the equilibrium law of motion is, for any u0 > uno;
ut+1 = u
no +
1
2
(ut   uno) :
The economy converges monotonically to a unique steady state with b = bno = 0
and u = uno = 1  e (0; 0). For u0  uno; ut = uno 8t > 0:
Proof. In addition to what is stated in the text, the constraint bt 2 [0; 1] remains to
be veried. The policy function B(ut) = [2= (w (2 + ))]  (ut   uno) is positive for
any ut  uno = 1 (1 + )w=2:However, if ut < uno; the restriction bt  0 will bind.
Thus, the guess in the text must be modied to B(ut) = [2= (w (2 + ))]  (ut   uno)
if ut  uno, and B(ut) = 0 otherwise. This new guess will still maximize the political
objective, (7). To see this, note that for any feasible policy (bt; bt+1), ut+1  uno.
Thus, when agents use the equilibrium policy rule to forecast bt+1 = B(ut+1); only
the part B(u) = [2= (w (2 + ))]  (u  uno) is relevant. For the same reason, U(b)
in (8) is una¤ected.
In the equilibrium of Proposition 2, redistribution occurs along the transition
path, i.e., as long as u0 > uno. In the long run, however, there is no redistribution.
Convergence is monotonic, and the dynamics are characterized by a positive root
equal to 1=2 (note that, since b is a linear function of u; then, in equilibrium bt+1 =
bt=2:): The speed of convergence is thus independent of w and :
Figure 2 represents the equilibrium policy function and the law of motion of
the state variable. The left-hand panel shows that when ut > uno, redistribution
is positive in equilibrium. Moreover, the equilibrium level of bt increases linearly
with ut. The right-hand panel illustrates how the equilibrium law of motion implies
monotonic asymptotic convergence to the steady state, as long as u0 > uno.
9Given the quadratic objective, it is straightforward to check that the rst-order condition will
be su¢ cient for a maximum. What remains is to check that the constraint bt 2 [0; 1] is satised
along the proposed equilibrium. This check is carried out in the technical appendix.
The Dynamics of Government. 13
*******Figure 2 about here********************
Our results can be interpreted as follows: when only the old inuence the po-
litical outcome, the equilibrium redistribution, Bno (ut) ; maximizes the average
income of the old. This implies maximizing the intergenerational transfer from
young to old individuals without any concern for intra-generational redistribution.
Intergenerational transfers benetting the current voters can, however, be achieved
by setting bt > 0 only if the proportion of old unsuccessful agents is higher than the
proportion of young unsuccessful, i.e., if ut > ut+1. In particular, no redistribution
can occur in steady state. The results of Proposition 2 generalize to the case of
! 2 [0; 1].
Turning to the participation of young voters, we have
Proposition 3 For a = 1 and any ! 2 [0; 1], the political equilibrium is character-
ized as follows:
Bn (ut) =
 2Z
w(1+Z) (ut   un) if ut  un
0 else
Un (bt) = u
n +
w
2
(1 + Z) bt;
and the equilibrium law of motion is, for any u0 > un;
ut+1 = u
n + Z (ut   un) ;
where Z 2 [0; 1=2] is a decreasing function of !: The economy converges monoton-
ically to a unique steady state with b = bn = 0 and u = un = 1   e (0; 0). For
u0  un; ut = un 8t > 0:
In the case when both young and old agents vote on current benets, the equilib-
rium has the same qualitative features as in the benchmark case (! = 0), provided
that ! < 1.10 In particular, redistribution occurs along the transition path, but
there is no welfare state in the long run. Since ! < 1; the old are politically prepon-
derant and the political equilibrium therefore favors redistribution from the young
to the old. Such redistribution can be achieved via positive benets if and only
if ut > ut+1. Therefore, redistribution is positive only along the transition to the
steady state. For any ! < 1, dynamics are characterized by a positive root Z  1=2:
The higher is !, the lower are the transfers and the atter are the equilibrium pol-
icy function and the law of motion in Figure 1. This is due to the fact that the
young exert political pressure against redistribution. With ! = 1; benets are zero
regardless of ut and the system immediately jumps to the steady state.
Hassler et al. (2003a) nd that in a model of majority voting, the welfare state
can survive in the long run, even though agents are risk-neutral. However, the
10When ! = 1, then Z = 0, so that the economy converges immediately to a steady-state with
zero redistribution. Moreover, when ! = 0, then Z = 1=2; so that this Proposition nests the result
of Proposition 2. An implicit expression for Z can be found in the technical appendix containing
the complete proofs.
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results here show that under probabilistic voting, redistribution must die o¤ in the
long run. For the same economic environment, the long-run state of the transfer
system can critically depend on the form of the democratic process. Moreover, the
transitional dynamics are here characterized by monotonic rather than oscillatory
convergence.
3.3. The case of risk-averse agents
In this section, we show that the political equilibrium features the long-run
survival of the welfare state under probabilistic voting, provided that a positive
proportion of agents in society are risk-averse. The convergence to the steady state
may be oscillatory or monotonic, depending on the extent of risk aversion and the
political inuence of the young.
As in the previous subsection, we will initially assume that the young agents
have no inuence in the voting process, i.e., that ! = 0. When a  1; the political
objective function, V (bt; bt+1; ut) ; can be expressed (up to scaling and excluding
constants) as follows:
V (bt; bt+1; ut) =
2R
1 +R
(1  ut) bt (10)
+utbt  

1  (1 + ) w
2
+
w
2
(bt + bt+1)

bt;
where R  (1  ) (a  1)  0 is the population weighted marginal utility of income
in excess of the marginal utility of entrepreneurs (unity), an aggregate measure of
societys desire to redistribute. This political objective function is derived as in
the case of risk neutrality, di¤ering by the rst term (the second line, as above,
equals (ut   ut+1)bt), which reects a positive e¤ect from redistribution whenever
aggregate risk aversion is positive: the higher marginal utility of workers makes
any redistributed dollar pay o¤ more, the higher is R. The part (1  ut) is the
fraction of old successful entrepreneurs, representing the size of the inelastic tax
base. This term inversely reects the distortionary cost of redistribution. We can
now characterize the equilibrium as follows.
Proposition 4 Assume ! = 0 and risk aversion (a). Then, 9Rmax > 1 such
that, if R 2 [0; Rmax], the political equilibrium is characterized as follows:
Bao (ut) =
(
bao + 2Zw(1+Z) (ut   uao) if ut  uao   w(1+Z)2Z bao
0 else
Uao (bt) = u
ao +
w
2
(1 + Z) (bt   bao) ;
and the equilibrium law of motion is, for any u0 > uao   w (1 + Z) = (2Z)  bao;
ut+1 = u
ao + Z (ut   uao) ;
where Z = (1 R) = [2 (1 +R)] 2 [ 1=2; 1=2]: Given u0, the economy converges to a
unique steady state, bao = 4R (1 + ) = [(1 + 3R) (2 + )] and uao = 1  e (bao; bao) :
Convergence is oscillating if R > 1; monotone if R < 1; and immediate if R = 1.
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Proof. (sketch) As in the proof of Proposition 1, we start by guessing that Bao
has a linear form, i.e., Bao (ut) = 0 + 1ut. Then, using equation (9), we obtain:
Bao (Uao (bt)) = 0 + 1
2  (1 +  (1  0))w
2  1w + bt
1w
2  1w:
Plugging in this expression in the rst-order condition of the maximization of (5)
with respect to bt; and solving for bt; yields
bt =
(2  1w)R
w (1 +R)
  1
w
+
1 +  (1  0)
2
+
1
2
(1 R) (2  1w)
(1 +R)w
ut;
which is linear, as conjectured. Equating the unknown coe¢ cients 0 and 1 and
substituting in the resulting values into the guess Bao (ut) = 0 + 1ut, yields the
equilibrium policy function Bao (ut) provided in the text. Moreover, plugging in the
values of 0 and 1 into equation (9), and simplifying terms, yields the equilibrium
expression for Uao (bt) :
To complete the proof, it must be shown that if R < Rmax, the constraint
b  1 is never binding in equilibrium. This is necessary for the equilibrium policy
function and the private decision rule to be linear and, hence, for the analytical
characterization of the political equilibrium to be valid. Formally, Rmax is dened
as the R such that Bao (0) = 1; see the technical appendix for further details.
Proposition 4 establishes that the dynamics of redistribution involve convergence
to a unique steady state, characterized by a positive benet rate, provided that some
agents are risk averse (R > 0). Note that, in equilibrium, benets inherit the same
dynamics as ut: bt+1 = bao + Z (bt   bao). Steady-state benets, bao; increase in
risk aversion and in the share of workers, while they decrease in the wage rate since
the distortionary e¤ect of benets increases with the return to e¤ort.
The equilibrium policy function and the dynamics of ut are depicted in Figure 3.
As long as R < 1, dynamics are characterized by a positive root, implying monotone
convergence. If instead R > 1, the benet rate is a decreasing function of ut and
the root Z is negative, implying convergence following an oscillatory pattern. In the
particular case where R = 1, convergence to the steady state occurs in one period.
************Figure 3 about here*********
The dynamics are characterized by two opposing forces. On the one hand, the
larger is the current share of unsuccessful entrepreneurs, ut, the higher is the tax
cost (and, hence, the distortion) per unit of benets. This is captured by the fact
that the rst term of (10) falls in ut, which reects the higher dependency ratio asso-
ciated with a higher share of unsuccessful old entrepreneurs a mechanism we label
the tax-base e¤ect. Through this e¤ect, a higher ut reduces the marginal (political)
value of benets, which tends to generate a negative relationship between b and u:
On the other hand, the larger is ut, the larger is the second term of (10), which
reects that intergenerational transfers in favor of the current old entrepreneurs
increase as u_t increases. This mechanism, labeled the constituency e¤ect implies
that a higher ut increases the marginal political value of redistribution, which tends
The Dynamics of Government. 16
to generate a positive relationship between b and u: When aggregate risk aversion
is low, the latter e¤ect dominates, while the opposite is true when aggregate risk
aversion is high. The reason for this is that when R is high, the political inuence
of the entrepreneurs diminishes as workers, on average, become more sensitive to
the issue of redistribution, due to their higher individual risk aversion. Since in-
tensity of preferences plays a key role in probabilistic voting models, this implies
that the policy implemented in equilibrium more closely reects the will of the aver-
age worker, namely attaining more redistribution. Consequently, intergenerational
redistribution between entrepreneurs becomes a less salient issue in the political
process and the policy outcome becomes less sensitive to the share of unsuccessful
entrepreneurs. Thus, the dynamics are dominated by the cost e¤ect. In sum, higher
aggregate risk aversion therefore increases steady state benets and reinforces the
tax-base e¤ect.
Proposition 4 can be generalized to the case where the young participate in
the political decision: ! 2 [0; 1]. The equilibrium has the same form as that in
Proposition 4. However, the expression for Z is complicated and we only state its
main properties here.
Proposition 5 Assume that 0  R  Rmax and ! 2 [0; 1]. The political equilib-
rium is then characterized as follows:
Ba (ut) =
(
ba + 2Zw(1+Z) (ut   ua) if ut  ua   w(1+Z)2Z ba
0 else
Ua (bt) = u
a +
w
2
(1 + Z) (bt   ba) ;
and the equilibrium law of motion is, for any u0 > ua   w (1 + Z) = (2Z)  ba;
ut+1 = u
a + Z (ut   ua) ;
where Z 2 ( 4=7; 1=2] is decreasing in !. Given u0, the economy converges to a
unique steady state, ba > 0 and ua > 0 (expressions in the technical appendix). Con-
vergence is oscillating if R > (1  !) = (1 + !) ; monotone if R < (1  !) = (1 + !),
and immediate if R = (1  !) = (1 + !).
We note that an increase in the political participation of the young decreases
the slope of the policy function. In particular, the sign of the slope coe¢ cient and
whether the dynamics are oscillatory depend on whether R 7 (1  !) = (1 + !) :
When the dynamics are monotone, the persistence of redistributive policies falls in
R (it can be shown that dZ=dR < 0 when Z > 0). This condition nests the result
of Proposition 4 that the policy function is upward- (downward-)sloping if and only
if R < 1 (R > 1) when ! = 0. If instead the young are as politically inuential as
the old (! = 1), the policy function becomes downward-sloping and the dynamics
are oscillatory for any positive level of risk aversion.
As far as the young are concerned, both the cost e¤ect and the intergenerational
redistribution motive imply that benets should be falling in ut (recall that the
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larger is ut, the larger is the transfer from the young to the old). Therefore, as the
inuence of the young increases, the intergenerational redistribution motive is mit-
igated. If ! < 1; the old retain some political preponderance, and intergenerational
transfers towards the old carry some weight in the political decision. If ! = 0, how-
ever, this motive disappears and the dynamics of redistribution are determined by
the cost e¤ect alone. Since the tax-base e¤ect implies a negative relation between
benets and the number of old unsuccessful entrepreneurs, a stronger inuence of
young voters reduces the slope of the policy function and tends to make dynamics
oscillatory.
Unfortunately, due to the complicated expression for Z, we have not been able
to sign the e¤ect of an increase in the participation of the young on steady-state
redistribution, although numerical analysis suggests that an increase in ! reduces
redistribution in the long run.
3.4. Finite-horizon results
In this section we seek to answer two related questions.11 First, we verify that
the Markov-perfect equilibria derived above are indeed limits of nite-horizon equi-
libria. Second, and more substantially, we wish to nd out whether there can be
more than one nite-horizon equilibrium, i.e., whether there can be a role for coor-
dination, and perhaps reputation, even in nite-horizon versions of this model.
The uniqueness question is a substantial one not only formally, but in a very applied
sense: it touches on the stabilityof government redistribution schemes, which was
recently challenged in Hassler et al. (2003a). In that paper, a simple version of the
present model with majority voting was shown to robustly produce multiple equi-
libria, independent of the time horizon. That is, a belief in the welfare system
seemed necessary to support the system. For brevity, we will not cover all cases
in this section; we concentrate on our baseline setup where only the old vote and
w = 1. First, we will study the limit of the nite-horizon case and then discuss
uniqueness.
We assume the economic environment to be identical to that of previous sections,
except in a nal period T where the newborn young make an e¤ort investment but
only live one period. In the nite-horizon economy, the equilibrium policy function
will, in general, be time-dependent. For t < T , equilibrium condition 1 is thus
modied to
Denition 6 Bt (ut) = argmaxbt2[0;b] V (bt; bt+1; ut) subject to bt+1 = B
t+1 (ut+1)
with ut+1 = 1  e (bt; bt+1) :
Guessing preliminarily that Bt+1 (u) is linear, i.e., Bt+1 (u) = At+1 +Bt+1u, it
is straightforward to show that an interior solution to the maximization problem at
period t yields a linear policy function Bt (u) = At+Btu: With j  T   t denoting
11This section discusses methodological aspects, and the reader may decide to skip it without
any loss of continuity.
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the number of periods until the last date, the system
Aj
Bj

=
"
 2   R1+R
0   1 R1+R 2
# 
Aj 1
Bj 1

+

2R
1+R   1 2
1 R
1+R

; (11)
determines the coe¢ cients Aj and Bj .12The solution to this linear system of di¤er-
ence equations is
Aj =

 
2
j
(A0  A) +

 
2
j  
1 

1 R
1 +R
j!
(B0  B) +A; (12)
Bj =

 
2
1 R
1 +R
j
(B0  B) +B;
where A0 and B0 now dene the policy rule in the last period (t = T ). As this
system is stable (the roots are  2 and  2 1 R1+R ), as j ! 1; the coe¢ cients of the
policy rule converge to
A  8R
(2 + ) (2 +  +R (2  ))  
1  
2 + 
;
B  2 1 R
2 (1 +R) +  (1 R) ;
and the policy rule is identical in the limit to innite horizon case detailed in
Proposition 4 for the case ! = 0 and w = 1.
Next, we derive the nal-period policy function, BT (u) and show that this is
unique and linear, with bT = A0+B0uT ; for all uT in the reachable range
h
1 
2 ; 1
i
.
This provides the initial condition for the di¤erence equation (12). Given the above
result, it follows that the nite horizon equilibrium is unique.
We propose a parametrization of the nal period which we regard as reasonable,
although the argument does not hinge on the specic choice. In particular, we
assume that the young born in the nal period live one period only, and that they
make an e¤ort choice. To make the nal period comparable to the previous ones,
we compensate for the fact that the young in the last period obtain return on e¤ort
only in one period by scaling down their disutility of e¤ort by (1 + ) 1. Thus, the
e¤ort cost is equal to e2= (1 + ) ; implying that the optimal e¤ort is equivalent to
that which agents living two periods would have chosen had they faced the benet
level bT in both periods. This optimal e¤ort level is eT = (1  bT ) 1+2 , implying
that taxes in the nal period are given by
T =
1
2

2 (1  ) + uT + 

1  
2
+ bT
1 + 
2

bT :
Substituting T into the utility function yields the following political objective
function:
VT (bT ; uT ) =  ((1  uT ) + uT bT ) + ((1  ) bT +RbT )  (1 +R) T :
12This equation follows from using bt+1 = Aj 1 +Bj 1ut+1 in the political objective function
(10).
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Maximizing VT (bT ; uT ) with respect to bT yields bT = A0 +B0uT , with
A0 =  1
2
1  
1 + 
+
2R
(1 +R) (1 + )
;
B0 =
1
1 + 
1 R
1 +R
:
For the sake of simplicity, the analysis has so far ignored the constraint that
b 2 [0; 1] : Characterizing the sequence of policy functions when these constraints
may bind is more complicated and the details of the results depend critically on
the exact form of the e¤ort function in the last period, about which we do not have
strong prior information.13
3.5. Voting with benevolence toward future generations
In this section, we shall study the case where agents (the old) vote with some
altruistic concern: they vote to maximize a welfare function which is a weighted
average of their own felicity and the welfare of the next generation.14 This case is
interesting since it allows us to relax the assumption that agents have no concern for
future generations, while retaining that the political mechanism lacks a commitment
technology. In the next section, we will compare these results with the Ramsey
allocation, where redistribution is set by a benevolent planner with access to a
commitment technology. In particular, we will stress the di¤erent dynamics of
redistribution in the two cases.
To derive a recursive formulation of the problem, we dene the weighted average
felicityacross both young and old agents at time t as
F (ut; bt; bt+1)   (1  )V owt (13)
+ ((1  ut)V oest + utV oeut ) +  (F y (e (bt; bt+1) ; bt;  t)) ;
where
F y (e (bt; bt+1) ; bt;  t)  (1  ) a (bt    t)
+

e (bt; bt+1) (w    t) + (1  e (bt; bt+1)) (bt    t)  e (bt; bt+1)2

;
13That economies where the constraint that b 2 [0; 1] never binds exist can easily be shown in
some special cases, such as when R = 1. In this case, Bj = B = 0 for all j  0; and, for all t;
Bt (u) = A
 
1 

 
2
j 
2 (1 + )
!
> 0;
since A = (1 +  + 2s (1  ) =) = (2 + ) : So the constraint is not binding when R = 1: By
continuity, the same argument carries over for values of R su¢ ciently close to one. For more
general values of the parameters, we also encountered no multiplicity, though some of our analysis
here relies on numerical methods.
14Agents, however, do not display altruism in their private behavior. For instance, they continue
to not insure their children against the ability shock. An alternative interpretation of the present
setup is that of a time-consistent benevolent planner choosing policy with some weight on future
generations.
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and  t = (bt; bt+1; ut).
The parameter  is a measure of intergenerational altruism. In particular,  2
[0; 1] and  2 [0; ] are the weights on the old and young currently alive. When
 = , the old are perfectly altruisticand value equally their old-age felicity and
that of the young. If, on the other hand,  = 0, we obtain the case analyzed in
Proposition 2. We restrict attention to economies where   ; so that altruism
cannot exceed 100%.
Since the problem is autonomous when policies are in the Markov class, a re-
cursive formulation of the political objective can be written as
W (ut)  max
bt2[0;1]
fF (ut; bt; bt+1) + W (ut+1)g ; (14)
subject to
bt+1 = B (U (bt)) ; ut+1 = U (bt) :
In direct analogy with our equilibrium denition above, we provide
Denition 7 A political equilibrium with altruistic voting is dened as a set of
functions hB;U;W i, where B : [0; 1] ! [0; 1] is a public policy rule, bt = B (ut),
U : [0; 1] ! [0; 1] is a private decision rule, ut+1 = U (bt), and W : [0; 1] ! is a
value function.
1. B (ut) = argmaxbt fF (ut; bt; bt+1) + W (ut+1)g subject to ut+1 = U (bt) ;
bt+1 = B (U (bt)) and bt 2 [0; 1] ;
2. U (bt) = 1  e (bt; bt+1) with bt+1 = B (U (bt)),
3. W (:) satises the Bellman equation (14).
The following can then be established.
Proposition 8 Assume that    (altruism, al) and 0  R  Rmax: The
political equilibrium with altruistic voting is characterized as follows:
Balo (ut) =
(
balo + 2Zw(1+Z)
 
ut   ualo

if ut  ualo   w(1+Z)2Z balo
0 else
Ualo (bt) = u
alo +
w
2
(1 + Z)
 
bt   balo

;
and the equilibrium law of motion is, for any u0 > ualo   w (1 + Z) = (2Z)  balo;
ut+1 = u
alo + Z
 
ut   ualo

;
where Z 2 [ 1= (2 + ) ; 1=2] is decreasing in R and . Given u0, the economy
converges to a unique steady state, balo  bao and ualo  uao (expressions in the
technical appendix). Convergence is oscillating if R > (   ) = ( + ), monotone
if R < (   ) = ( + ) ; and immediate if R = (   ) = ( + ) :
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The proposition establishes that the slope coe¢ cient of the policy function is
decreasing in : Namely, the altruistic motive in the political equilibrium reduces
the interest in intergenerational redistribution, and tends to make e¢ ciency con-
siderations more important (similarly to when we considered political participation
of the young). This strengthens the tax-base e¤ect, and tends to make dynamics
oscillatory. In particular, if  =  and R > 0, the dynamics are oscillatory, indicat-
ing that the tax-base e¤ect dominates the constituency e¤ect. However, oscillations
need not occur: for  < , and R su¢ ciently small, dynamics are monotone. In
general, however, votersaltruism toward future generations is a force toward oscil-
latory dynamics.15
4. The Ramsey allocation with commitment
In this section, we show that optimal policy to be precisely dened below in
the present model necessarily involves oscillations in taxation and redistribution.
Specically, we characterize the full commitment solution in the case where the
planners weights on generation t is t, i.e., the planner discounts the felicity of
di¤erent generations at the same rate as that the private agents use for discounting
their own felicity over time. In this particular case, the solution is relatively simple.
We also briey extend the analysis to the case where the planner discounts the
future with a general factor   . In the general case, however, the optimal
tax sequence is more involved. Since the main focus of this paper is on political
economy, we limit attention in this case to long-run properties.
4.1. Statement of the commitment problem
The choice set of the planner is the set of sequences of benets, fbtg1t=0, that
are feasible for some sequence of taxes and associated private e¤ort choices. We
assume that the planner can commit to future benets; we refer to this problem as
the Ramsey problem and to its solution as the Ramsey allocation. The planner is
assumed to be perfectly utilitarian when evaluating the utility of ex-ante identical
agents. To simplify, we assume that she discounts future generations at a constant
rate by attaching a weight t to agents born at time t. In the analysis of the political
allocation, we will assume balanced budgets in each period and, to compare the
two allocations, we also impose this assumption on the Ramsey allocation.16 The
15 It is natural to expect that steady-state redistribution should be decreasing in , since more
altruistic agents care more about the negative externality that current redistribution imposes on
future generations via the future tax base. Although we have not been able to formally establish
this relation, we have not found any numerical counterexample.
16 Interestingly, it can be shown that when  = , the balanced budget restriction does not
bind for the Ramsey planner, who would choose the same allocation also if she was allowed to
accumulate debt or savings. See Hassler et al. (2004).
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planner chooses the sequence of bt 8t  0 in order to maximize
W (u0)   (1  )V ow0 +  (1  u0)V oes0 + u0V oeu0 (15)
+
1X
t=0
t+1 (V yet + (1  )V ywt ) ;
subject to
bt 2 [0; 1] ; (16)
 t =

 (bt; bt+1; ut) ; for t = 0,
 (bt; bt+1; 1  e (bt 1; bt)) ; for t  1;
et = e (bt; bt+1) :
4.2. Characterizing the solution: a recursive formulation
The planners problem, (15), does not admit a standard recursive formulation
since its solution is time-inconsistent. Intuitively, the choice of bt+1 takes into
account how the e¤ort choice at t is inuenced, but this e¤ort choice is bygone when
the time comes to implement bt+1. It is well known that Ramsey problems admit
a two-stage formulation whereby future decisions, in stage two, can be described
as coming from a recursive problem with an additional state variable whereas the
time-zero decisions, in stage one, can be derived from a static problem whose
payo¤s are given by the value function associated with the solution to the recursive
problem.17 In this framework, we will show that the second-stage recursive problem
is particularly simple in that it involves one state variable only: next periods level
of transfers. This result follows from the fact that since individuals live for two
periods only, a benevolent planner who can commit for one period only chooses the
same level of redistribution as a planner who could commit for all future periods.
Specically, if the planner in period t chooses bt+1, she would have chosen the same
bt+1 if she had had the ability to commit at any period s < t: Furthermore, although
the ow of felicity in period t is a¤ected by both the predetermined variables ut
and bt, the optimal choice of bt+1 is only a¤ected by bt: Therefore, the recursive
program only has bt as a state variable, with bt+1 being the choice variable. As for
the initial choice, the planner is not subject to earlier pre-commitments and thus,
chooses b0 and b1 simultaneously. We thus prove that
Lemma 9 The utilitarian planner program (15) is equivalent to the following re-
cursive program:
W (u0) = max
b02[0;1]
fY0 (u0; b0) + V (b0)g (17)
V (bt) = max
bt+12[0;1]
fY (bt; bt+1) + V (bt+1)g for t  0; (18)
17See, e.g., Marcet and Marimon (1999), where the additional state variable is marginal utility
or the Lagrange multiplier associated with the incentive constraint.
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where Y0 (u0; b0) is a linear-quadratic function (see proof) and
Y (bt; bt+1) =

w2
4

 2  (1 + ) ( + )R  2 bt
   (1 + ) ( + ) (R+ 1)    22 b2t
 

( + )
2
(R+ 1)  2

btbt+1
+ 22bt+1   2b2t+1

+Q;
where Q is a constant dened in the proof.
Tthe mapping   (v) = maxb02[0;1] fY (b; b0) + v (b0)g is a contraction mapping with
V as the unique xed point.
Proof. Consider the Ramsey-problem as formulated in (15). Now, dene the
planners period t felicity, i.e., the weighted average felicityacross young and old
agents at time t for t  1, as
F (bt 1; bt; bt+1)   (1  )V owt + 
 
et 1V
oes
t +
 
1  et 1

V oeut

(19)
+

wet + (1  et ) btw   (et )2    t

+  (1  ) a (btw    t) ;
subject to ej = e (bj ; bj+1) and  t =  (bt; bt+1; 1  e (bt 1; bt)). Note that the func-
tion F (bt 1; bt; bt+1) is additively separable in (bt 1; bt) and (bt; bt+1). More for-
mally, there exist (linear-quadratic) functions G andH such that F (bt 1; bt; bt+1) =
G (bt 1; bt) +H (bt; bt+1), where
G (bt 1; bt) =  w
2
4
((( + ) (R+ 1)  2) btbt 1 + 2bt 1) ;
H (bt; bt+1) =

w2
4

 [2 ((1 + ) ( + ) (R+ 1)  (1 + 2)   ) bt
   (1 + ) ( + ) (R+ 1)    22 b2t
+ 22bt+1   2b2t+1    ( + ) (R+ 1) btbt+1

+Q;
where Q   (1 + ) (2 +  (1  ))w2=4: Dene now Y (bt; bt+1)  G (bt; bt+1)+
H (bt; bt+1). Using this and the denition of the function F0 (u0; b0; b1) from equa-
tion (13), the planner problem under commitment (15) can be expressed as
W (u0) = maxfbtg1t=0
(
F0 (u0; b0; b1) +
1X
t=1
tF (bt 1; bt; bt+1)
)
= max
fbtg1t=0
(
F0 (b0; b1; u0) H (b0; b1) +
1X
t=0
t (G (bt; bt+1) +H (bt; bt+1))
)
= max
fbtg1t=0
(
Y0 (u0; b0) +
1X
t=0
tY (bt; bt+1)
)
; (20)
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where Y0  F0 (b0; b1; u0) H (b0; b1) is given by
Y0 (b0; u0) =
w
2

(( + ) (R+ 1)  2)

1  u0   w
2
(1 + )

+ w2

b0
+
w2
4
 (( + ) (R+ 1)  2) b20 + w

1  u0   w
2
(1 + )

:
Clearly, we can rewrite (20) as
W (u0) = max
b0
(
Y0 (u0; b0) + maxfbtg1t=1
1X
t=0
tY (bt; bt+1)
)
(21)
= max
b0
(
Y0 (u0; b0) + max
b1
(
Y (b0; b1) + maxfbtg1t=2
1X
t=1
tY (bt; bt+1)
))
Dening the value function V (bt)  maxfbt+sg1s=1
P1
s=0 
sY (bt+s; bt+s+1), standard
recursion on (21) yields the functional Bellman equation (18) for t  1. Since Y is
bounded by the fact that b 2 [0; 1] and since 0   < 1; the Bellman equation (18)
is a contraction mapping with a unique solution, which must also be the solution
to the sequential continuation problem (Theorem 4.3 in Stokey and Lucas, 1989).
Given V , it follows from the sequential formulation (20) that benets in the initial
period can be determined from the static problem (17).
The recursive formulation in Lemma 9 shows that the optimal policy can be
represented in terms of two policy rules. The rst rule, which sets the initial choice
of redistribution, maps the initial (predetermined) proportion of unsuccessful entre-
preneurs into initial choices of redistribution. The second rule applies from period
one onwards and maps previous periods benets into current benets: bt = f (bt 1).
The policy rule bt = f (bt 1) is not globally linear, except in the case  = . This
case is a natural benchmark, as it implies that the planner discounts future felicities
at the same rate as that by which agents discount future within their life horizon.
In this case, it is possible to attain a simple closed-form solution, summarized in
the following Proposition (proof in the technical appendix).18
Proposition 10 The optimal solution to the planner program (15) in the case  =
 is
bt = b
p   (bt 1   bp) ;8t  1;
and
b0 =

1 +
1  u0
(1  ) w2

bp;
18The proof strategy is as follows. We start by guessing that the value function V is linear-
quadratic in b, V (b) = A0+A1b+A2b2, where A0, A1, and A2 are unknown coe¢ cients. We then
compute the envelope condition and the rst-order condition and use them to verify the initial
guess for particular values of the coe¢ cients. The resulting value function satises the functional
equation (18) and hence, by the contraction mapping theorem, is the unique solution. The policy
function implied by the rst-order condition is as reported in the proposition. Solving for the
initial policy b0 is then straightforward.
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where
bp  R
1 + 2R
:
As is clear from the proposition, the period-0 choice of the planner depends
negatively on the initial condition u0, which represents the size of the inelastic tax
base at zero (investments in period minus one are sunk when the planner sets the
period-0 benets). As long as u0 < 1, the planner chooses initial benets larger
than or equal to bp, and then oscillate forever between this level and another level
at the other side of bp. This is a particular case of the more general analysis of
capital taxation developed in Hassler et al. (2004), to which we refer the reader for
a more detailed analysis.
When  < , the dynamics continue to be oscillatory, but they are explosive.
Consider the denition of the function Y (bt; bt+1) given in Lemma 9. If the con-
straint bt+1 2 (0; 1) is not binding, the optimal allocation must satisfy the following
rst-order condition: Y2(bt; bt+1) + Y1(bt+1; bt+2) = 0. This follows from a stan-
dard envelope argument and the rst-order condition on the Bellman equation (18).
Calculating the derivatives and simplifying terms yields the following dynamic sys-
tem:
0 + 1bt + 2bt+1 + 1bt+2  0; (22)
0  2 (1 + ) ( + )R  0
1   

( + )
2
(R+ 1)  2

< 0
2   2
 
(1 + ) ( + ) (R+ 1)    2 < 0
This dynamic system is exactly linear, and it has the important property that
the coe¢ cients on bt, bt+1, and bt+2 are all negative.19 Moreover, in the case where
 < ; both roots of the characteristic equation associated with (22) are smaller
than minus one. Thus, the dynamics cannot converge to a steady-state. Based on
numerical analysis, we conclude that benets converge to a two-period cycle where
the constraint b  0 binds every second period.20 Thus, the optimal plan never
converges to a steady state, and in the long run, redistribution moves between zero
and a positive level of redistribution.
19The fact that all coe¢ cients are negative follows from Y being strictly concave in each of its
arguments separately, and from bt and bt+1 displaying substitutability. Intuitively, concavity
follows from the convex cost function for e¤ort and the fact that taxation is more costly on the
margin, the higher is its level. The substitutability reects the fact that e¤ort depends on both bt
and bt+1, so if one of these variables is high, the cost of increasing marginally the other is high.
20More precisely, in the long run the economy oscillates between zero and
~b = min
8<: R  1(1  )R+    +2
(1+)(+)
 ; 1
9=; :
We have also analyzed the case where  > , and have found that the dynamics then converge (as
long as  is not too large) in an oscillatory fashion to a steady-state. Details are available upon
request.
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It might seem surprising that the planner chooses an oscillating sequence, but
it turns out that this minimizes the distortion associated with redistribution. As
noted in the introduction, the reason is that the investments made by young agents
in period t have an e¤ect on the tax cost of redistribution both in period t and
period t + 1. More precisely, if benets in period t   1 are large (small), young
entrepreneurs will make a small (large) investment e¤ort in that period. Thus, in
period t, the old entrepreneurs will be relatively unsuccessful (successful), and there
will be many (few) benet recipients in that period. Therefore, the tax rate required
to nance a certain benet level will be relatively large (small). Since distortions
to e¤ort are convex in nature, redistribution is relatively costly (cheap) in period t,
and the planner will set relatively small (large) benets. Applying a similar logic
for period t+1, it is clear why the optimal sequence of benets might be oscillatory.
Intuitively, the planner reduces the distortion of benets in period t by choosing
lower benets in the next period, as the investment decision of the young in period t
depends on redistribution both in period t and period t+1. When the planner sets
benets at a particular value, bt, she takes into account the e¤ects of this on felicity
in t 1, t, and t+1. Therefore, the decision is both backward- and forward-looking.
Without commitment, the backward-looking aspect disappears, having, as we will
see below, qualitative consequences for redistribution dynamics.
In summary, this section has established that the Ramsey dynamics are os-
cillatory, and do not converge to a steady-state. This is in sharp contrast with
the political equilibrium described in the previous sections. Even in the case where
agents vote with altruism (section 3.5.), the equilibrium always features convergence
to a steady-state. Thus, an important conclusion of this paper is that the political
mechanism dampens e¢ cient uctuations and, in some cases, even generates policy
persistence (i.e., monotonic convergence).
5. Conclusion
Many political-economy questions call for analysis in dynamic settings. How-
ever, the literature lacks analytical frameworks where voting and economic decision
making are both rational and forward-looking, and where the dynamic mechanisms
are fully operative. In most of the existing papers with rational and optimizing
agents, the dynamics are either muted by preferences that mimic myopia (under
some conditions, logarithmic utility has this feature) or by a lack of dynamic de-
cision variables (such as investment) that call for forward-looking expectations.
Alternatively, the dynamics must be analyzed using numerical methods. In this
paper, we have constructed a positive model where redistribution and social insur-
ance take place in a dynamic setting: the taxation underlying these expenditures
distorts human capital accumulation. In our economy, current taxation thus sets
o¤ nontrivial political and economic dynamics and the agents take these dynamics
into account when making decisions. We are thus able to conduct both exercises of
comparative statics analyzing the e¤ects of primitives on long-run outcomes
and of comparative dynamics analyzing the e¤ects of primitives on short-run
outcomes. We focus on the case where the political system a setting where policy
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decisions are made through probabilistic voting cannot, either formally or through
reputation e¤ects, commit to future policy decisions.
The model is analytically tractable, making the mechanisms determining the
dynamics transparent. Relative to constrained-optimal allocations, i.e., alloca-
tions which would result if a planner could set all taxes and transfers at time 0 to
maximize some weighted utility of all agents, we nd the political system to have a
stabilizing role. In particular, the lack of commitment makes (optimal) oscillatory
responses to disturbances become weaker or disappear. This e¤ect can be qualita-
tively important: for a large range of parameter values, the constrained optimum
prescribes limit cycles, whereas the political equilibrium never does.
We have identied two opposing mechanisms underlying the determination of
redistribution and how it evolves over time. One of these mechanisms is the con-
stituency e¤ect . A larger number of individuals benetting from redistribution
tends to increase the level of benets. Such an increase in redistribution induces a
change in individual actions, which in turn increases future demand for redistribu-
tion. Thus, the constituency e¤ect tends to induce positive feedback, and therefore
persistence, in the size of government.
We believe that such an e¤ect may also operate in other areas of government
activity. For example, an expansion of government employment may induce educa-
tional choices suited for government jobs and therefore make future reductions in
investments politically costly; an e¤ect stressed by, among others, Lindbeck (1995).
In this paper, we have used probabilistic voting as the political aggregator of prefer-
ences. This voting model provides a smooth mapping from the distribution of pref-
erences to political outcomes, which means that the constituency e¤ect is smooth,
operating over a large range of the domain of the state-variable. In particular, in this
paper, the constituency e¤ect generates persistence in the level of redistribution,
but eventually redistribution always returns to a unique steady state.
In contrast to the smooth operation of probabilistic voting, Downsian majority
voting may lead to abrupt changes in policy when the preferences of the median
voter change. Therefore, the constituency e¤ect can be stronger under majority
voting than under probabilistic voting, not only leading to persistence but to com-
plete hysteresis as in Hassler et al. (2003a), where a temporary shock to the demand
for redistribution may lead to indenitely high levels of redistribution. Our model
therefore predicts that, ceteris paribus, countries with a political system closer in
line with the smooth (discontinuous) preference aggregation of probabilistic voting
(majority voting) should have weaker (stronger) policy persistence. Another dif-
ference between these institutions that follows from this logic and that we analyze
in this paper is that majority voting can lead to expectational equilibria beliefs
that the government will (continue to) be large in the future can be self-fullling
whereas probabilistic voting cannot.
The second mechanism behind the dynamics of government we identify is the
tax-base e¤ect . According to this e¤ect, positive redistribution today leads to higher
future costs of redistribution, since higher levels of redistribution reduce investments
and thereby shrink the future size of the tax base. Since higher costs of redistribu-
tion reduce the attractiveness and therefore the political viability of redistribution,
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the tax-base e¤ect produces a negative feedback inducing oscillating dynamics. The
tax-base e¤ect is the only active channel underlying the constrained-optimal allo-
cation.
We have showed that there are several factors that can strengthen the relative
importance of the constituency and tax-base e¤ects in our political equilibrium,
thereby determining the extent to which equilibrium dynamics are persistent or
oscillatory.
First, an increased political inuence of individuals behind the veil of ignorance,
or by young agents in our terminology, tends to increase the relative importance
of the costs of redistribution and, thus, of the tax-base e¤ect. This is a natural
consequence of the fact that conicts of redistribution strengthen with age when
individuals are exposed to idiosyncratic shocks. Individuals with ex-ante coinciding
interests on social insurance may later in life be divided into losersand winners
from redistribution. As the political inuence of the latter is diminished, the relative
sizes of the winning and losing groups become less important as, instead, the com-
mon ex-ante interest wins the political upper hand. Furthermore, the distortionary
costs of redistribution are partly borne in the future, since current redistribution
reduces the future size of the tax base. This is a greater concern for young indi-
viduals with a longer remaining lifetime. However, whenever the ex-post interest is
politically preponderant, a case which we deem to be the most likely, dynamics are
monotone and redistribution persistent.
Second, more concern about the welfare of future generations also strengthens
the tax-base e¤ect. When the old voters are altruistic vis-à-vis the young, they
appreciate the ex-ante interest and not only their own ex-post interest. Therefore,
altruism vis-à-vis future generations tends to generate less persistence; in fact, when
the old place the same weight on their own utility as on that of their o¤spring,
dynamics are always oscillatory.
Third, an ability to commit future levels of redistribution strengthens the tax-
base e¤ect. Since future benets distort current investment choices, thus increasing
the current cost of redistribution, agents have an interest in curtailing future re-
distribution. This interest is particularly strong if current redistribution is chosen
to be high. Therefore, commitment tends to induce a negative feedback and oscil-
lating dynamics. In particular, when the discount factor on future cohorts equals
the private intertemporal discount factor, dynamics are characterized by a unitary
negative root, producing everlasting oscillations of constant amplitude.
Finally, we have found that higher risk aversion also strengthens the tax-base
e¤ect. In our model, we have separated the insurance value of redistribution from
its distortive costs by assuming that individuals in need of redistribution do not
make choices distorted by redistribution. In a more general setting, an increase
in risk-aversion might also a¤ect the marginal utility of unsuccessful agents whose
investment decisions are sensitive to the amount of redistribution. In such a case,
the constituency e¤ect should also be strengthened by higher risk aversion, making
the total e¤ect on dynamics ambiguous.
In conclusion, we have identied several parameters a¤ecting the dynamics of
redistribution. We leave the task of confronting the models predictions to data to
The Dynamics of Government. 29
future research.
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